ABSTRACT Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are often subject to failures caused by energy depletion, software or hardware fault of nodes, environmental events, hostile attacks, and other reasons. It is critical to ensure a WSN application system is available during some presence of fault or interruption. Recent work in topology control has shown that a reasonable topology can improve the robustness of WSN. However, due to the limited resource of sensor nodes, topology control cannot easily tradeoff between fault tolerance and energy saving. To address this issue, we present a regular hexagonal-based clustering scheme (RHCS) and a scale-free topology evolution mechanism (SFTEM) for WSNs, which increases network survivability as well as maintains energy balance. RHCS uses a regular hexagonal structure for clustering sensor nodes, which satisfies at least 1-coverage fault-tolerance. SFTEM combines the reliability of RHCS with scalefree properties to connect clusters to form a robust WSN, which exploits the synergy between reliable clustering scheme and topology evolution, and can tolerate comprehensive faults including random failure and energy failure. In addition, to evaluate the performance of SFTEM, the simulation experiments were carried out to compare three factors including fault-tolerance, intrusion-tolerance, and energy balance with other methods in literature. The simulation results show that, the performance of SFTEM is superior to those of the referenced topology evolution mechanisms of WSNs.
I. INTRODUCTION
Wireless sensor networks (WSNs) are usually composed of a large number of distributed sensor nodes organized in an ad-hoc pattern to monitor environments [1] , [2] . In many applications, it requires high coverage and reliability to accomplish rigorous monitoring tasks, such as military mission [3] , volcanic monitoring [4] , [5] , and forest fire prevention [6] , [7] . It further exacerbates the design challenge of meeting application requirements. WSNs always operate in unattended or hostile environments [8] - [10] . The sensor nodes in WSNs are easy to breakdown caused by energy depletion or natural disaster and deliberate attack [11] , [12] . In addition, the failed sensor nodes would reduce the coverage of the network, would split originally connected network, and even lead to an entire global network paralysis. For example, if the several sensor nodes are breakdown and miss detecting the activity of the volcano malfunctions and gives fault readings, it might result in unneeded panic or loss of lives due to the absence of warning.
In order to ensure high quality of service, it is essential for a WSN to be able to detect its faulty sensor nodes before carrying out necessary recovery actions. Fault detection in WSN is a technique which identifies a fault when it occurred and pinpoints the type of fault and its location. Fault detection techniques can be classified into centralized, distributed and hybrid [13] . In centralized approach, many algorithms are based on machine learning techniques [14] -27]. Distributed fault detection algorithms included neighborhood-based, probability-based, selfdetection and cloud-based. Many distributed algorithms are proposed based on Bayesian model [18] - [20] . Hybrid algorithms are used in multi-tiered WSNs in which sensor nodes are organized into clusters with cluster heads (CHs). Clustering routing protocols have a variety of advantages, such as more scalability, less load, less energy consumption and more robustness [21] . Low-Energy Adaptive Clustering Hierarchy (LEACH) is one of the pioneering clustering routing approaches for WSNs. LEACH is to select sensor nodes as CHs by rotation, so the high energy dissipation in communicating with the base station is spread to all sensor nodes in the network. The basic idea of LEACH has been an inspiration for many subsequent clustering routing protocols, including Hybrid Energy-Efficient Distributed clustering (HEED), Two-Level Hierarchy LEACH (TL-LEACH) and Energy Efficient Clustering Scheme (EECS), etc.
Fault detection helps in isolating faulty sensors. Clustering routing scheme makes it more convenient for network topology control, and can respond to network changes composed of node's increasing and unpredicted failures. To solve the problem of random failure and hostile attack and energy depletion of sensor nodes in WSNs deployed in harsh environment, a robust topology can be designed to improve survivability of network. In this paper, we focus on studying reliable clustering scheme based on regular hexagonal structure, and fault-tolerant clustering topology evolution mechanism of WSNs, aiming to improve network fault tolerance and intrusion tolerance and energy balance.
A. RELATED WORK
Many mechanisms have been proposed for fault tolerance in WSNs to achieve reliability assurance, energy saving, and prolong the lifetime. Among them, node redundancy [22] - [24] is one of the important approaches. Korbi et al. [25] proposed a new fault-tolerant (FT) procedure to ensure both coverage and connectivity based on node redundancy. It is a proactive approach in the sense that it aims to replace the ''up to fail'' node before its defection. Mukhopadhyay et al. [26] proposed Markov models for WSNs reliability analysis. They also presented a reliability comparison for various numbers of defective nodes' replacements with hot-standby redundant nodes. Bein et al. [27] studied the coverage problem for WSNs from the faulttolerance and reliability point of view. They proposed three 1-fault tolerant sensor deployment models. The placement of the sensors forms regular shapes, square or hexagonal. They also developed Markov models for each of the schemes and calculate their reliability. Munir et al. [28] modeled and analyzed fault detection and fault-tolerance in WSNs composed of duplex sensor nodes. They investigated the synergy between fault detection and fault-tolerance and use the fault detection algorithms' accuracies in their modeling of fault-tolerant WSNs.
Topology control is one of the critical factors which can influence the performance of WSNs. Xu et al. [29] investigated a dynamic topology control scheme to improve the network lifetime for WSNs in the presence of selfish sensors. A non-cooperative game aided topology control approach was developed for designing energy-efficient and energy balanced network topologies dynamically. Each sensor in the topology control game tried to minimize its unwillingness for constructing a connected network according to its transmission power. Albert and Barabasi [30] put forward the formation mechanism of power-law distribution in complex networks from the point view of dynamic and growing, which was called scale-free network, and constructed BarabasiAlbert (BA) model. The discovery of scale-free properties paves a new way to enhance the invulnerability of network topology. In scale-free WSNs, the small proportion of sensor nodes possesses most connections of the network, and most of the sensor nodes are low-degree, hence it has high resistance to random failure. Based on scale-free concepts and BA model, numerous studies have been devoted to promoting the structural robustness by designing the topology of the network. Zheng et al. [31] proposed a topology evolution model based on scale-free networks in theory. They not only considered the node fitness but also considered the node residual energy and node communication range of their practical evolution model, which improved the network energy balance and made the topology have a good robustness against random faults. Similarly, Liu et al. [32] presented a topology model with scale-free concepts and combined more characteristics of sensors, including residual energy, degree saturation, and maximum communication radius. The topology model improved energy efficiency as well as enhanced network robustness. Fu et al. [33] proposed a topology upgrading method by referencing the concept of a small word. Their scheme could improve the energy balance of the network significantly. Liu et al. [34] constructed a scalefree model which can assure the topological fault-tolerance against random faults and maximize topological intrusiontolerance against selective remove attacks. The scaling exponent of degree distribution of the network can be adjustable.
B. CONTRIBUTIONS
The above mentioned studies show that the scale-free topology is robust to random failure but vulnerable to intrusion attack. In addition, in scale-free WSNs, a few key nodes possess most connections of network. The energy of these nodes will be depleted much faster than other nodes, thus threatening the normal operation of the entire network. To tolerate comprehensive faults and keep energy balance, we exploit the synergy between reliable clustering scheme and topology evolution. In this paper, we first construct a reliable clustering scheme of nodes and analyze its reliability based on the Markov model. And then, we present a scale-free topology evolution mechanism of WSNs. The contributions of this paper are: 1) A regular hexagonal-based clustering scheme (RHCS) with FT sensor nodes as the vertexes of the hexagon is constructed. We characterize the reliability and fault rate hierarchically at FT sensor node and RHCS using Markov model. Then we obtain the random failure probability (RFP) of RHCS. 2) We discuss the energy failure probability (EFP) of RHCS. Then we combine the RFP and EFP to model the JFP of RHCS. The relationship between the JFP and its important parameters is analyzed by the mathematical method to prepare the theory for topology evolution mechanism. 3) A scale-free topology evolution mechanism (SFTEM) based on RHCS is presented. We treat a RHCS as an FT cluster, and evolve the topology based on the FT clusters. The connection strategy combines joint failure probability (JFP) and other characteristics of FT cluster, including node degree, node saturation and the distance between the cluster heads. 4) Comparison of simulation experimental results to demonstrate the superiority of the proposed SFTEM over the existing models. In the remainder of this paper, Section II elaborates on the construction of RHCS. Section III models and analyzes the JFP of RHCS. Section IV describes our FT clustering topology evolution mechanism. Simulations and results are presented in Section V. Section VI concludes our study.
II. TRUCTION of RHCS
In this section, we first introduce the FT sensor node and analyze the failure rate using Markov method. Then, the RHCS with FT sensor nodes as the vertexes of the hexagon is established. Moreover, we investigate the relationship between the reliability of RHCS and the failure rate of FT nodes based on the Markov model. Finally, we exploit different initial state of RHCS and obtain the RFP.
A. FT SENSOR NODE
Node redundancy would be most effective to enhance the FT capability of sensor nodes. Hence, we refer the duplex sensor node as an FT sensor node [28] . In FT sensor node model, we assume that the redundant node is in a cold standby mode. The inactive node becomes active only when the active node is diagnosed faulty.
Definition 1 [Node Failure Rate λ t (NIST [35]):]
The failure rate of a sensor node can be expressed as an exponential distribution with a failure rate of λ t over the time t s .
The exponential model works well for those inter-arrival times where the total number of events in a given time period is given by the Poisson distribution. When these events trigger failures, the exponential lifetime distribution model naturally applies [28] .
Definition 2 [Node Degree k (Ismail and Mohamed [36] )]: The degree of a node is the number of edges connected to the node.
Definition 3 [Coverage (Ammari and Habib [37] )]: Coverage of an entire area otherwise known as full or blanket coverage means that every single point within the field of interest is within the sensing range of at least one sensor node.
Definition 4 (Fault Diagnosis Accuracy Factor c):
Fault diagnosis accuracy factor c represents the probability that an active sensor node has been correctively diagnosed and replaced by a backup sensor node. Factor c depends on node degree k and the cumulative probability of sensor failure λ t [28] . We model c (c ≤ 1) with the empirical relation:
Where M (λ t ) is the function of λ t and denotes an adjustment parameter that may correspond loosely to the desired average node degree required to achieve a good fault detection accuracy for a given λ t .
FIGURE 1. Markov model of FT sensor node (Munir et al. [28]).
The Markov model of the FT sensor node is depicted in Fig. 1 . The states in the Markov model represent the number of good sensor nodes. State 1 and State 2 represent the active state, and State 0 means that sensor node is failed. When the active node falls to fail, the node will transfer State 2 to State 1 if the fault is correctly diagnosed, else the node will transfer to State 0; when the node in State 1 fails, the node will directly transfer to State 0. We finally obtain the average failure rate of the FT sensor node (See the details in [28] ).
B. REGULAR HEXAGONAL-BASED CLUSTERING SCHEME
The sensing and transmission range of a sensor node are modeled as a disk of radius r s and r c , respectively. Zhang and Hou [38] have proved that if the ratio between the transmission range and the sensing range, denoted as r cs , is not smaller than 2, then coverage implies connectivity. They have also shown that a regular triangular lattice pattern is optimal when the ratio r cs ≤ √
Definition 5 (k-Coverage Fault-Tolerance):
If the node clustering scheme removes k nodes and still maintains the coverage of the scheme, the scheme is said to have k-coverage fault-tolerance.
FT sensor nodes are placed as shown in Fig. 2 (a). The black contour disk is the sensing range of the common FT sensor nodes, and the radius of the disk is r s . Six common FT nodes form a regular hexagonal structure. The strong FT node is located in the center of the hexagonal, whose sensing range is denoted as red contour disk and its radius of the disk is As shown in Fig. 2(b) , we analyze the k-coverage clustering scheme. According to Definition 4, we can get that the green area of the model represents 1-coverage fault-tolerance; the yellow area is 3-coverage fault-tolerance, and the red area expresses 5-coverage fault-tolerance. Therefore, the model meets at least 1-coverage fault-tolerance. We call this scheme regular hexagonal-based clustering scheme (RHCS).
C. RANDOM FAILURE PROBABILITY (RFP) ANALYSIS of RHCS
We make the following assumptions for the analysis of RFP of RHCS.
• When the strong FT node keeps operate properly, regardless of whether or not common FT nodes fail, RHCS is regarded as effective.
• When the strong FT node crashed but no common FT node fails, RHCS is considered effective;
• When the strong FT node crashed, once any common FT node fails, RHCS is considered breakdown. Based on above assumptions, we exploit different initial state of RHCS and obtain the RFP. 
1) RHCS FAULT-FREE IN INITIAL STATE
When the sensor nodes are fault-free in the initial state of RHCS, we use the Markov model to analyze the scheme reliability, as shown in Fig. 3 . State '(7, 1)' means that all sensor nodes are operational, '7' means 7 common FT sensor nodes, '1' means the strong FT sensor node. When the strong FT node fails, the state is called '(7, 0)'; State '(6, 1)' represents that one of 7 common nodes fails, and the strong FT node is operational. When the entire model fails, the state is '(0, 0)'. The common FT node failure rate is λ FT , and the failure rate of the strong FT node is λ sFT .
The RFP of the model is the probability of the scheme to be in any failed states. Assuming λ sFT = λ FT , we obtain the RFP of the model depicted in Fig. 3 by solving the differential equation (See Appendix for more details):
2) RHCS HAS ONE OR MORE FAULT NODES IN INNITIAL STATE
If the strong FT node fails in initial state of RHCS, we know that once any common FT node failure occurs again, RHCS is considered to be invalid. Its Markov model is shown in Fig. 4 . If the strong FT node is operational and the common FT node fails in initial state of RHCS, no matter how several faults occur, the Markov model can be represented as shown in Fig. 5 . We obtain the RFP of the above model in Fig. 4 and Fig. 5 by solving the differential equation (See Appendix for more details):
Where λ FT is related to f (k) (Equation. (3)), and f (k) depends on the number of the faulty nodes in RHCS.
Combined with the above analysis, the RFP of RHCS can be divided into two cases:
• When the nodes are fault-free in the initial state of RHCS, the RFP of RHCS is shown in (4).
• When RHCS has any faulty nodes in its initial state, the RFP of RHCS is shown in (5).
III. MODELING AND ANALYSIS OF JOINT FAILURE PROBABILITY IN RHCS
In this section, we first discuss the energy failure probability (EFP) of RHCS. Then we combine the RFP and EFP to model the JFP of RHCS. Finally, the relationship between the JFP and its important parameters is analyzed by the mathematical method to prepare the theory for topology evolution in the next section.
A. ENERGY FAILURE PROBABILITY (EFP)
We adopt the classic First-order radio energy consumption model of wireless communication in our paper. The energy consumption of sending a l-bit message is
where E elec is data fusion energy consumption, ε amp is amplifier power consumption, and d is the transmission radius of the node. The energy consumption of receiving a one-bit message is E r = E elec · l. So the total energy consumption of the node is E c = E tx + E r . For RHCS, the basic structure of the scheme is a regular hexagon. If the topology is evolved based on RHCS, then the energy consumption will have little difference among the clusters. Therefore, considering the actual deployment requirements, the size of RHCS will change according to the distance d, as shown in Fig. 6 , where d ∈ [ According to the energy model above, we obtain the total energy consumption of RHCS:
Where n c is the number of nodes in RHCS that are operational.
If the initial energy of RHCS is E 0 , the EFP of the model can be described as (Mizanian et al. [39] ):
According to (7) , P e can also be written as:
B. JOINT FAILURE PROBABILITY (JFP)
Combining the RFP and EFP of RHCS, the joint failure probability (JFP) of the model is established.
• When the nodes are fault-free in the initial state of RHCS, the JFP is described as:
• When RHCS has any faulty nodes in the initial state, the JFP is defined as: 
then RHCS meets the comprehensive demand.
Proof: For simplicity, we prove that if the JFP satisfies (12) , then RHCS meets the comprehensive demand.
According to the condition t ≥ t min , we get
Since
Based on (13) and (14), it can be deduced that
Then, we deduce
Because t ≥ t min , we have
Then, we obtain
Based on (19) and (23), we get
When the JFP of RHCS satisfies (14) , denoted as P 0 , the model can meet the comprehensive demand of lifetime and joint fault-tolerance.
2) QUANTITATIVE ANALYSIS OF JFP
The above qualitative analysis transforms the comprehensive demand of network's lifetime and joint fault-tolerance into the requirement of network's JFP. By quantitative analysis of JFP, we obtain the relationship between the node degree function f (k) and the distance d between adjacent nodes with the maximum lifetime satisfying P = P 0 for JFP of network, which is shown in (20) .
We transform (20) into the following formula:
where
Then, Equation (20) can be described as
When d or t increases, function F(d, t) increases, so we know that function F(d, t) has a positive correlation with both d and t, and when d takes the minimum value, t will take the maximum value t max 1 to keep the F 0 unchanged; when f (k) increases, function G(f (k), t) decreases; and when t increases, function G(f (k), t) increases, so we call that function G(f (k), t) is negatively correlated withf (k) and positively correlated with t, when f (k) max takes the maximum value, t will also take the maximum value t max 2 to keep G 0 constant. We compare the value of t max 1 and t max 2 : 
IV. TOPOLOG Y EVOLUTION MECHANISM AND DYNAMIC CHARACTERISTIC ANALYSIS
As a kind of energy-constrained distributed network, WSNs tend to adopt clustering structure in many cases to prolong the lifetime of the network. WSNs have obvious dynamic characteristics, including the increase of new nodes and new links, and the node failures caused by environmental factors or energy depletion. In this section, we evolve the scalefree topology based on the reliable distribution of cluster heads of FT clusters. Here, the process of evolution refers to the addition of new FT cluster heads to the network. Sensor nodes in the network are divided into strong FT nodes and common FT nodes. The common FT nodes join the network as in-cluster members of FT clusters and establish communication with the fixed cluster heads of FT clusters. When the strong FT nodes as cluster heads join the network, they will establish links with the cluster heads of other FT clusters, and use multi-hop communication to transmit the data.
A. CLUSTERING SCALE-FREE TOPOLOGY EVOLUTION MECHANISM
When a new cluster head joins the network, the JFP of the FT cluster, denoted as P, the degree k of cluster head and the distance D between cluster heads are taken as the evaluation criteria. Let the fitness function F be the reciprocal of the product of the P and D between the cluster heads. The probability of existing cluster head in the network being selected to connect with the new added cluster head depends on the value of F and k. Meanwhile, we set the threshold of k as k max , it means that the maximum connection number of cluster head cannot exceed k max . Specific evolution rules are as follows: 1) Network initialization: At initial time t = 0, the initial network consists of m 0 FT clusters and e 0 edges, and at least one edge of cluster heads of each FT cluster is connected with other cluster heads. 2) Preferential growth connection: At each time interval, one FT cluster head is added, m cluster heads of the existing FT cluster are selected to connect, and adding FT nodes in the cluster based on the structure of RHCS to form a new FT cluster. The probability k i represents that an existing FT cluster head is selected to be connected obeys the following rule:
Where
is the node degree of the cluster node of FT cluster i, P(i) is the JFP of the i th FT cluster, and D i is the distance between the new cluster head and the cluster head of i th FT cluster. Obviously, according to the connection rules, when the node degree of the FT cluster head is k max , the probability of the FT cluster being selected to connect is zero.
The fitness function F combines the JFP with the distance between cluster heads of FT clusters, which considers the integrated failure probability of the FT clusters to be selected, including the RFP and EFP, and controls the energy consumption of the cluster head; that is, the smaller the distance is, the lower the energy consumption is. Meanwhile, k max affects the distribution of k and the energy balance of the network.
B. DYNAMIC CHARACTERISTICS ANALYSIS
With the mean-field theory (Barabási et al. [40] ), we analyze the distribution of k in the network. Assuming that the node degree k i is continuous changing, and thus the probability can be considered as a continuous rate of change of k. Consequently, we get the dynamic equation for node i as follows:
The distribution of k in the network has obvious heterogeneity according to the generation mechanism, which means that a few cluster heads account for most of the connections in the network, and the majority of nodes only have small proportion of the connections. Therefore, we get (1− 
Where F is the expectation of fitness, andk represents the average node degree of the local world cluster heads. By the preferential connection rules, the network adds mt links after t time intervals, and each link connects two nodes, so the newly added node degree is 2mt.
After substituting (26) and (25) into (24), we get
Since k i (t = t i ) = m, the (31) can be simplified as follows.
Solving (28), we get
Where β =
, thus the probability that a cluster head has a connectivity smaller than k i (t) is:
The probability of density p(k) can be obtained using
Consequently, we conclude that node degree distribution p(k) of cluster head conforms to the power law distribution and the law exponent is γ = 1/β + 1. Therefore, the network generated by the SFTEM satisfies the characteristics of the scale-free network, and has the fault-tolerance of the scalefree network. 
V. SIMULATION AND ANALYSIS
We use the Matlab simulation tool to verify the theoretical results and the performance of SFTEM in this study. Assuming that sensor nodes are randomly deployed in a twodimensional plane region, the initial energy of nodes is the same. In the initial network, the number m 0 of FT clusters is 4, and the connection number of newly added cluster heads denoted as m, is set to 2. To exclude errors caused by randomness, every experimental result is an average of 50 times simulation. The network parameters are shown in Table 1 . 
A. NODE DEGREE DISTRIBUTION OF SFTEM
In each generated topology by the SFTEM, we evaluate the degree distribution of the FT cluster head of the network. After 50 runs of simulation, we obtain the average values of these 50 results, as shown in Fig. 7 . Meanwhile, in order VOLUME 6, 2018 to evaluate the influence of node degree threshold k max on the SFTEM, k max takes four different values of 15, 20, 25 and 30 to analyze the distribution of node degree respectively, the results are given in Fig. 8 . As expected, Fig. 7 shows that the actual degree distribution is basically consistent with the theoretical distribution, thus the network topologies generated by SFTEM have the characteristics of scale-free networks, and can meet the robustness requirements in harsh environments. Moreover, Fig. 8 depicts that the heavy-tailed phenomenon in the degree distribution enhanced with the increase of k max obviously. Therefore, by limiting the maximum degree of the FT cluster nodes, the degree heterogeneity of the network can be reduced, and the energy consumption balance can also be improved, so as to prolong the lifetime of network. To achieve a tradeoff between the performance of fault-tolerance and energy consumption, we take k max = 20 as the parameter of the following simulation.
B. RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN LIFETIME AND f ( k) AND d
Equation (2) demonstrates that f (k) is correlated with node failure rate λ t , the failure rate empirical function M (λ t ), and node degree k. Because the number m of links of the newly added cluster heads is set to 2, the minimum degree k of the cluster head is 2. The values of f (k) (k = 2, 6, 10, 14, 18, 20) are shown in Table 2 . Table 2 shows the fault diagnosis accuracy factor c (f (k)) decreases with the increase of node failure rate λ t . Particularly, if λ t ≥ 0.1, f (k) is less than 1 for any k. Therefore, λ t is taken as 0.05 in the following simulation. It can be seen that f (k) min = 0.7 and f (k) max = 1.03 from Table 2 . To observe the relationship between f (k) and k more clearly, we plot a graph of the curve between f (k) and k as shown in Fig. 9 . Fig. 9 reveals the fact that when k ∈ [6, 15] , f (k) ≥ 1, which means that once the node fails, it can be successfully replaced by the backup node. From the quantitative analysis of JFP in section III, if f (k) min = 0.7 and f (k) max = 1.03, then t max 2 > t max 1 , and The results shown in Fig. 10 demonstrate that when f (k) = f (k) max , d = d 0 , the network lifetime is the longest of the four simulations. It well validates the theoretical results presented in section III. These results reveal that the lifetime of the network prolonged with the increase of f (k). Obviously, when the distance d between adjacent nodes in the FT cluster increases, the energy consumption of the data transmission increases, which decreases the lifetime of the network. However, the JFP increases with the increases of d. d 0 is the compromise theoretical value that makes the lifetime achieve the optimal value. Therefore, the following simulations will take f (k) = f (k) max , d = d 0 as parameters of the topology evolution.
C. FAULT-TOLERANCE AND INTRUSION-TOLERANCE COMPARISON
To evaluate the fault-tolerance and intrusion-tolerance of RHCS topology, we compare the traditional BA model, Model 1 [32] and Model 2 [34] , Model 1 has the advantage of energy balance, and Model 2 has the stronger network fault-tolerance and intrusion-tolerance. The initial network of the four topology evolution mechanism is the same, and the simulation parameters are all referenced in Table 1 . In the fault-tolerance comparison simulation, the failure nodes are generated randomly according to Poisson distribution. The failure nodes are removed after each simulation time. We use C to denote the number of nodes in the maximum connected component to measure the fault-tolerance and intrusiontolerance of topology. . 11 shows the comparison among the fault-tolerance of four topologies. Before 4000 simulation times, C of BA topology is slightly bigger than SFTEM topology, because the BA model only considers the node degree in its topology evolution, it can achieve the optimal fault-tolerance. However, the availability of BA topology is low due to failure to consider energy balance [42] , so when the simulation time exceeds 4000, the fault-tolerant performance of BA model is becoming poor, as shown in Fig. 11 . Fig. 11 also shows that C of SFTEM topology is bigger than that of Model 1 and Model 2 at each simulation time, it indicates that SFTEM topology can better ensure the network connectivity in the case of a comprehensive failure, and it has a strong faulttolerance against the comprehensive fault. SFTEM considers the impact of comprehensive fault on network fault-tolerance so that the results of SFTEM topology show better robustness for the energy exhaustion and random failure of nodes. In the intrusion-tolerance simulation, we randomly remove the cluster heads with high degree, and the removal ratio ranged from 0.05 to 0.25. Fig. 12 displays the comparison of intrusion-tolerance of four topologies. From Fig. 12 , we know that SFTEM has the strongest capacity against deliberate attack. When the percentage of nodes removed under selective attack is 0.15, C of SFTEM is up to 0.65, and Model 2 also maintains good intrusion-tolerance, C of which can keep 0.425. However, C of Model 1 is 0.123 and BA model is only 0.075 which means the network is almost paralysis; when the percentage of nodes removed reaches 0.25, C of SFTEM is still 0.125, and C of other three models approaches 0. Because SFTEM considers the factor of FT cluster energy consumption and node saturation, its degree distribution is more uniform, thus the topologies evolved by SFTEM have a good intrusion-tolerance. Model 2 can change the power-law scaling exponent by adjusting its parameter, so the degree distribution can be adjusted and to improve the intrusion-tolerance of the network [34] .
D. COMPARISON OF ENERGY BALANCE
Let EC represent the ratio of node energy consumption to the initial energy. The higher EC is, the greater the energy consumption is. And the smaller difference of EC of cluster heads means that the more balanced energy consumption distribution of the network. We compare SFTEM with Model 1, for Model 1 considering the residual energy of nodes in its evolution rules. Fig. 13 displays the energy consumption distribution of the network of SFTEM topology and Model 1 topology.
As shown in Fig. 13 , in both network topologies, the area near the sink node is the high energy-consuming area. Compared with Model 1, energy consumption of SFTEM is more uniform than that of Model 1. In SFTEM, the highest EC is 0.755 and the maximum difference of EC among the cluster heads around the sink node is about 0.12. However, the highest EC is 0.875 in Model 1 and the difference among the cluster heads around the sink node is relatively big, even the maximum of the difference of EC is higher than 0.2.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
WSNs are susceptible to failure due to the vulnerability of sensor nodes and attacks from malicious intruders. Hence, the fault-tolerance is an important issue in WSN applications. In this paper, we construct a regular hexagonal-based clustering scheme (RHCS) of sensor networks and analyze the reliability of RHCS based on Markov model. Then, we present a scale-free topology evolution mechanism (SFTEM). We also analyze the dynamic characteristics of SFTEM using meanfield theory. Simulation results show that the node degree distribution of SFTEM follows a power law distribution, and both the fault-tolerance and intrusion-tolerance of RHCS outperform other models. However, our study has not taken into account the transformation of backup nodes after node failures. In the future, we will focus on developing a scheduling technique for the backup nodes that will wake up one or more backup nodes when the failure occurs in the network.
APPENDIX
We present major steps in computing the reliability function of the Markov models of section 2.
A. RHCS WITH NO FAULTY NODES
The differential equation of the model is: (7, 1) (t) = −(λ sFT + 7λ FT )P (7,1) (t) P (7,0) (t) = −7λ FT P (7, 0) (t) + λ sFT P (7,1) (t) P (6,1) (t) = −(λ sFT + 6λ FT )P (6,1) (t) + 7λ FT P (7,1) (t) P (5,1) (t) = −(λ sFT + 5λ FT )P (5,1) (t) + 6λ FT P (6,1) (t) P (4,1) (t) = −(λ sFT + 4λ FT )P (4,1) (t) + 5λ FT P (5,1) (t) P (3,1) (t) = −(λ sFT + 3λ FT )P (3,1) (t) + 4λ FT P (4,1) (t) P (2,1) (t) = −(λ sFT + 2λ FT )P (2,1) (t) + 3λ FT P (3,1) (t) P (1,1) (t) = −(λ sFT + λ FT )P (1,1) (t) + 2λ FT P (2,1) (t) P (0,1) (t) = −λ sFT P (0,1) (t) + λ FT P (1,1) (t) P F (t) = P F (t) + 7λ FT P (7,0) (t) + λ sFT (P (6,1) (t) + P (5,1) (t) +P (4,1) (t) + P (3,1) (t) + P (2,1) (t) + P (1,1) (t) +P (0,1) (t) Assuming λ sFT = λ FT , and with the initial values P (7,1) (0) = 1, P (7,0) (0) = P (6,1) (0) = P (5,1) (0) = P (4,1) (0) = P (3,1) (0) = P (2,1) (0) = P (1,1) (0) = P (0,1) (0) = 0, we solve the above equation and obtain: 
B. MARKOV MODEL OF RHCS WITH STRONG FT NODE FAILURE
The differential equation of the model is: P (7,0) (t) = −7λ FT P (7,0) (t) P (0,0) (t) = 7λ FT P (7, 0) (t) Solving the above equation with the initial conditions P (7,0) (0) = 1 and P (0,0) (0) = 0 yields: P F (t) = P (0,0) (t) = 1 − e −λ FT t
C. MARKOV MODEL OF RHCS WITH STRONG FT NODE FAILURE
The differential equation of the model is:
P (n,1) (t) = −(λ sFT + nλ FT )P (n,1) (t) P (n−1,1) (t) = −(λ sFT + (n − 1)λ FT )P (n−1,1) (t) +nλ FT P (n,1) (t) · · · P (1,1) (t) = −(λ sFT + λ FT )P (1,1) (t) + 2λ FT P (2,1) (t) P (0,1) (t) = −λ sFT P (0,1) (t) + λ FT P (1,1) (t) P F (t) = P F (t) + λ sFT (P (n,1) (t) + P (n−1,1) (t) + · · · +P (1,1) (t) + P (0,1) (t) + P (1,1) (t) + P (0,1) (t)) Assuming λ sFT = λ FT , and with the initial values P (n,1) (0) = 1, P ((n−1),0) (0) = . . . = P (1,1) (0) = P (0,1) (0) 
